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Party competition in a heterogeneous electorate  
the role of dominant-issue voters  
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. 
The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting deci-
sion primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective 
function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern 
of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence 
proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy prefer-
ence, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy platforms. The 
difference in policy platforms is not reduced. The conclusions are found to be compatible with 
some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group.  
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1. Introduction  
In their voting decision in representative democracies, voters have to decide on numerous 
issues at the same time. The decisions made thereby have considerable influence on the 
voters’ utility, though the extent to which the decision on a certain policy issue affects a 
voter’s utility will differ across voters, depending on their individual situation. Different groups 
of voters can therefore be expected to emphasize on different parts of the political agenda 
when deciding which party to vote for. Congleton (1991) provides a model of the political de-
cision making process which accounts for the heterogeneity in the electorate’s preferences 
by introducing the notion of single-issue-voting. This paper will pick up his basic idea and 
develop another model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The model pre-
sented below differs from the approach taken by Congleton (1991) in two distinct features. 
First, the paper draws on the literature on party competition (especially, Denzau and Munger, 
1986; Coughlin et al., 1990) to provide a richer model of party behavior. In particular, it ac-
counts for the fact that parties have policy preferences (e.g., Wittman, 1983; Kalt and Zupan, 
1984). Second this paper argues that voters who base their voting decision predominantly on 
one issue regularly have policy preferences which are at the extreme ends of the scale of 
preferences rather than in its centre. As a consequence, the emerging pattern of movement 
in policy platforms does not resemble the convergence as proposed by the spatial theory of 
voting. Instead, the platforms follow the attractive forces of the dominant-issue voters and 
move in parallel rather than towards the centre as well as towards each other. Consequently, 
there is no mechanism which regularly reduces the distance between policy platforms in the 
course of the election race.  
The paper starts by giving a brief overview on the existing literature on policy convergence in 
section 2. Section 3 introduces political parties and voters as major agents of the political 
decision making process. The notion of dominant-issue-voters is introduced. Section 4 illus-
trates the consecutive pattern of movement in policy platforms that will emerge when political 
parties compete for the majority of votes before section 5 relates the major findings of the 
model to the empirical observations in party competition.  
2. Policy convergence in the spatial theory of voting– a review of literature 
Though differing in the assumptions concerning e.g. the objective function of political parties 
or the composition and behavior of the electorate, all models following the spatial theory of 
voting have a number of common features (e.g., Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Merrill and Grof-
man, 1999).1 When modelling the political decision making process, they assign the central 
role to the political parties. In general, two parties following different ideologies or represent-
ing the interests of different constituencies of voters (e.g., Roemer, 1994) are assumed to 
compete for political power. In most models, the policy space is assumed to have only one 
                                                
1 This paper refers to the proximity models of the spatial theory of issue voting and excludes the directional mod-
els of voting (see Merrill and Grofman, 1999). 
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dimension. This can either be the classical ideological left-wing / right wing scale. Alterna-
tively, the scale can depict the preferred amount of a certain publicly provided good (e.g., 
Inman, 1978) or the preferred degree of income redistribution (e.g., Orr, 1976; Roemer, 
1994).  
Due to differences in ideology and policy preferences, the voters’ bliss points will be dis-
persed across this political scale. The parties’ bliss points are positioned in distinct distance 
to the median position of the relevant electorate. In addition, they are assumed to be on op-
posite sides of the median position (e.g., Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 8-14). The starting point 
of their competition is marked by the situation in which both parties offer policy platforms in 
accordance with their bliss points. Regardless of their assumed objective function, both par-
ties serve their own objective by offering policy platforms which are closer to the median 
voter’s position than their own bliss point. The policy platforms will thus converge in the 
course of the election race. The process of convergence is characterized by three central 
features. First, the difference between policy platforms is reduced. Second, the centre of the 
scale of preferences is the gravitational centre towards which the platforms converge. Third, 
the policy platforms approach each other by moving in opposite directions. 
In the original Downsian model, the political competition leads both parties to offer identical 
platforms which reflect the median voter’s bliss point. A number of authors of later articles 
have adopted the basic mechanism of the Downsian model but extended it in a number of 
ways which made it more compatible with the lack of full convergence observed in real life 
party competition (e.g., Budge and Robertson, 1987). One reason for this lack of full conver-
gence proposed by Wittman (1983) and others is that the policy preferences of politicians are 
too strong to make full convergence rational ex ante. Alesina (1988) adds that parties with 
strong policy preferences may lack credibility when offering policy platforms which deviate 
too far from their bliss points. Palfrey (1984) points out that parties which move too far to the 
centre are threatened by new parties entering the political arena on their extreme ends. This 
threatening market entrance restricts the parties in their movement to the median voter’s po-
sition. Roemer (1994) argues that uncertainty about the distribution of voters’ preferences 
may restrict the political parties in moving their policy platforms to the centre of the political 
scale.  
Within the spatial theory of voting, only a small number of models analyses the policy-
formulating process in a two- or even multidimensional policy space. Some of these models 
simultaneously assume that the voters’ position on the different scales are a monotonous 
function of their individual income. Thereby the multidimensional scale of preferences on 
different policy issues is de facto reduced to the single dimension of individual income. The 
multidimensional median position is held by the voter with the median income. He respec-
tively his positions on the different issues will exert the attractive force on the parties’ policy 
platforms (e.g., Inman, 1978; Persson and Tabellini, 2002: 96-97). The result of convergence 
continues to apply.  
Plott (1967) was the first to analyse party competition in a truly multidimensional issue space. 
He shows that policy platforms will only converge to one particular median platform if a num-
ber of very specific conditions apply. Basically, the voters’ bliss points must be arranged 
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symmetrically around this single median bliss point in the hyperspace of policy combinations. 
In this case, policy platforms can be expected to move towards the (multidimensional) me-
dian voter’s position. The difference in policy platform is reduced. Assuming that the bliss 
points of both parties are located on opposite sides of the median position, the policy plat-
forms will move towards each other, thereby reducing the distance between them. Hence 
convergence as described for the one-dimensional case also applies to the electoral compe-
tition in a multidimensional policy space.  
If the symmetry condition stated by Plott (1967) is violated, policy platforms do not converge 
to a single position in the policy space. Instead, the equilibrium demands both parties to 
choose a mixed strategy out of a set of policy platforms. Dependent on the distribution of 
voters’ preferences, this set of policy platforms takes on a different size and dispersion (e.g., 
McKelvey, 1976; Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel, 1984). If the distribution of preferences is 
reasonably close to being symmetric – which Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel (1984) argue 
can be assumed for real life electorates – the set will be concentrated near a “generalized 
median” (see also McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1976). Due to the difference in ideology, the 
parties’ bliss points are located on opposite side of this “generalized median”. If they are fur-
thermore located outside the set of possible policy platforms to choose from, the movement 
in policy platforms again shows central features of convergence in the above-defined sense. 
The platforms move towards the centre of the policy space and thereby towards each other. 
Consequently the distance between them is reduced. If, however, the set of possible policy 
platforms comprises the parties’ bliss points, the election race does not cause convergence, 
nor does any other predictable pattern of movement in policy platforms emerge.  
3. Agents involved in the political decision making process 
3.1 Political parties 
In most democracies, especially in Europe, the political competition is primarily carried out by 
political parties rather than by individual candidates. This paper assumes that only two par-
ties A and B - differing in their basic ideology - compete for power. As the policy-space is 
assumed to be multidimensional, the ideological positions of the party members manifest in 
the so-called ideal party programme PRGA* respectively PRGB* rather than in a single bliss-
point. This ideal party programme can be thought of as a vector of length L, where L denotes 
the total number of issues on the political agenda. Each element of the vector represents the 
party members’ aggregated position on one particular issue. As the political parties differ 
ideologically, they can be expected to have different positions on most issues.  
Each party is interpreted as a sort of enterprise which tries to maximize the utility of its mem-
bers, especially the candidates (e.g., Galeotti and Bretton, 1986; Jones and Hudson, 1997). 
As their utility depends largely on their income, prestige and power as a member of parlia-
ment or government, the primary party objective is to achieve political posts for as many of 
its candidates as possible. The number of available posts is especially large if the party wins 
the election and is allowed to fill positions in the government and top bureaucracy. Hence it 
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can be assumed that the primary objective of a political party is to win the election by attract-
ing the majority of votes.  
In the competition for this majority of votes, it is in most cases necessary for a political party 
to offer a policy platform PRGP that deviates from PRGP* in different positions (Coughlin et. 
al., 1990). The changes that a party makes to PRGP* during the election are hereafter called 
(programmatic) concessions (Denzau and Munger, 1986). In this paper, it is assumed that 
the winning party puts through the party programme PRGP it offered on the election day. 
Otherwise it would destroy the effectiveness of concessions and thereby give away its most 
important instrument in future election races. Empirical results suggest that this assumption 
is tenable (e.g., Rallings, 1987). 
Following Wittman (1983) and Kalt and Zupan (1984), parties are assumed to have strong 
policy preferences. Therefore the more concessions a party makes to win the election, the 
lower its members’ utility once in power. The fact that a party can only put through any of its 
own positions if it wins the election constitutes a clear hierarchy of objectives. The objective 
function is thus lexicographic with the primary objective to win the election and the secondary 
one to minimize concessions.  
3.2 Voters 
In this paper, voters are assumed to be rational individuals who try to maximize their utility in 
general as when voting (e.g., Fain and Dworkin, 1993; Jones and Hudson, 1997). Following 
the empirical evidence, it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of voters draws a 
positive utility from the act of voting, even though they know that their vote will not tip the 
scales (e.g., Weck-Hannemann, 1995; Kan and Yang, 2001). Each voter is assumed to have 
a predisposition to vote for one of the parties. This predisposition is independent of their pol-
icy platforms in concrete form. Instead, it may account for differences in perceived valence of 
parties to solve the major problems ahead (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000) or result 
from the fact that the voter prefers one party’s basic ideology (e.g., Coughlin et al., 1990). 
Following Coughlin et al. (1990), the individual voter j’s predisposition for a party is ex-
pressed by his individual voting bias bj. If bj > 0, the vote goes to party A, for values of bj < 0, 
voter j votes for party B. The larger |bj|, the stronger the voter’s predisposition.  
Next to the individual voting bias, the policy platforms of the parties determine the voting de-
cisions. If bj = 0, voter j will vote for that one party whose policy platform, if put into action, 
provides him with a higher expected utility (Coughlin et al., 1990). The total utility he draws 





jj b)PRG(U)PRG(UU        (1) 
A positive value indicates that voter j can expect an increase in utility if party A wins the elec-
tion. Hence he will vote for this party. If expression (1) takes on a negative value, voter j will 
give his vote to party B.  
Due to the minute effect the individual vote has on the outcome of an election, rational voters 
do not spend any resources solely to collect information for voting purposes. Much of the 
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politically relevant information is, nevertheless, collected on the side while engaging in other 
activities (Fiorina, 1996). Politically relevant information from newspapers, radio and TV, for 
instance, is usually obtained while consuming these media for reasons of entertainment or 
leisure (Rudzio, 1996; Strömberg, 2001). However, this information conveys only limited and 
unsystematic knowledge about the detailed policies proposed by the competing parties. It 
determines the individual voting bias, but it is not sufficient to calculate the utility differential 
Ui(PRG
A) - Ui(PRG
B) and hence make an informed vote.  
Making an informed vote requires detailed information about the parties’ policy platforms. 
Many voters acquire detailed knowledge about some policy issues at work. This will usually 
be restricted to those parts of the policy platforms which affect the specific industry or profes-
sion. Civil servants, for instance, will acquire detailed information about the parties’ plans on 
their field of activity (e.g., Frey and Pommerehne, 1982), while e.g. farmers can be assumed 
to be well-informed about agricultural policy plans. Furthermore, voters collect detailed infor-
mation about certain policy issues when this is privately valuable (e.g., Congleton, 2001). 
Depending on the individual voter’s situation, this information may concern child-care pro-
grammes, housing subsidies etc.  
In sum, different groups of voters can be expected to have different fields of policies in which 
their knowledge is detailed enough to judge the parties on policy platform grounds. These 
fields can be expected to have a notable impact on their individual utility. At the same time, 
their knowledge about the other fields of policy is incomplete. They may know some crude 
general indicator like the current overall tax burden, but their knowledge about the parties’ 
exact positions on reforming taxation is too limited to calculate the resulting changes in tax 
burden and utility in detail. Thus when making their voting decision, these voters will consider 
their voting bias plus the observed utility differential from those few issues of the political 
agenda on which their knowledge allows an informed vote. This paper follows Congleton 
(1991) in assuming that each voter regards only one issue when making his voting decision. 
The limitation to one issue may first follow from the above-mentioned limits in detailed infor-
mation or the fact that the issue is by far the most important among the politically determined 
arguments of the voter’s utility function. Second, a voter who has more than one important 
issue can reduce the costs of decision making by basing his voting-decision predominantly 
on the most important issue. This behavior is regularly reported for human decision making 
in other fields (e.g., Tversky, 1969; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). All so-called dominant-issue-
voters who follow the same dominant issue are aggregated to one group. A heterogeneous 
electorate as assumed in this paper consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters 
having different dominant issues to base their voting decision on. Some of these groups will 
centre around a common profession or industry, while others may base their voting decision 
on governmental policies concerning e.g. environmental, child-care, defence or religious is-
sues.2  
                                                
2  It is possible that a number of voters do not have sufficient information to make an informed vote. These will 
vote by their voting bias (e.g., Coughlin et al., 1990). The existence of these uninformed voters does, however, 
not change the basic results of this paper and will thus be ignored hereafter. 
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4. Party competition and the pattern of movement in policy platforms 
The following analysis takes the same starting point as the spatial theory of voting. Therein, 
both parties offer their ideal party programmes. It is assumed that the resulting distribution of 
votes is close. Consequently both parties have to make concessions in order to win the elec-
tion respectively to avoid losing it. The starting point of party competition is depicted in figure 
1. Following empirical evidence, it is unreasonable to assume that one party will demand a 
low intensity of governmental activity on all issues while the other one always prefers a high 
intensity. Instead, parties emphasize different policy issues, each preferring a high intensity 
of government activity on some issues (e.g., Budge and Robertson, 1987). Following the 
spatial theory of voting, the median positions (denoted by the circled “M”) on all issues are 
assumed to be located between PRGA* and PRGB*.3 Due to the importance of the dominant 
issue for the dominant-issue-voters, the latter will prefer a policy which places a higher em-
phasis on their particular dominant issue than the average member of society. In other 
words, dominant-issue-voters will regularly inhabit the radical ends rather than the centre of 
the scale of policy preferences on their dominant issue. Therefore, the demanded policy will 
not represent the median position of the entire voting population but serve the more “radical” 
members of society. In figure 1, the preferred positions of dominant-issue-voters are denoted 
DIV. For the following analyses, it is important to understand that the particular positions of 
the dominant-issue-voters, political parties and the median position of the electorate in figure 
1 are randomly chosen for illustrative reasons and are not meant to resemble any real-world 
pattern. 






1 DIV a M b
2 a M b DIV
3 a M b DIV
4 DIV b M a
5 b M a DIV
intensity of govermental 
interventions/activity
 
                                                
3  This assumption may not hold for all issues in real world politics. It is, however, very useful for the for the 
purpose of this paper, in which the author tries to show that the movement in policy platforms does not follow the 
concept of convergence but rather takes the form of parallel moves. 
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The presentation of voters’ preferences in figure 1 differs from the one used in the spatial 
theory of voting. It does not present the bliss points in multidimensional space and thus does 
not explicitly show the interrelations between the dimensions in policy space which result e.g. 
from the necessity to balance the state budget. A voter’s position only represents the pre-
ferred policy in the particular issue. The aggregated distribution of preferences can be inter-
preted as a result of an opinion poll on this policy issue. Consequently, the median position 
on one issue simply represents the median intensity of governmental intervention demanded 
in this particular issue.  
For two reasons, it is impossible to read the distribution of votes from this figure. First, the 
ideological bias which is different for each voter co-determines the voting decision but cannot 
be accounted for in figure 1. Second, as illustrated above, the figure cannot capture interrela-
tions in the particular issue. This makes it impossible to calculate the net gains in utility a 
certain voter expects from the party programmes as a whole. In this respect, the relationship 
between the median position and the parties’ positions does not contain any information con-
cerning the net gain of the voter in the median position on this issue. For the dominant-issue-
voters, on the other hand, the relevant information is contained. The latter will prefer the 
party whose position is closer to its own. This does, however, still not mean that all voters 
who consider the relevant issue dominant will vote for this party, because the voting bias can 
outweigh the utility differential from the policy platforms.  
The large parties in modern democracies do not represent one particular constituency of vot-
ers but recruit their members from many different parts of society. Consequently, dominant-
issue-voters can be expected to demand policies which are more radical than the policies 
proposed in PRGA* and PRGB* - perceived from the point of view of the median voter. For 
instance, farmers demand higher subsidies than the parties are willing to give, teachers de-
mand higher wages and better working conditions, young families demand better and 
cheaper child-care facilities and so forth.  
4.1 The direction of movement in policy platforms  
Taking the starting point depicted in figure 1, assume for illustrative reasons that party com-
petition can be described as a sequential game in which party A is the first to move. It can 
make changes to its ideal party programme in those issues that represent a dominant issue 
for a group of dominant-issue-voters. In figure 2, its new policy platform PRGA is denoted by 
large “A”s. The positions all issues 1 to 5 are changed in favor of interest dominant-issue-
voters. In the case of issue 1 and 5, the addressed group of dominant-issue-voters prefers 
PRGA* over PRGB*. The move towards DIV in this position increases the difference between 
the positions of the two parties and makes party A even more preferable than it already was 
for those voters who consider the corresponding issue dominant. This increases the utility 
difference Ui(PRG
A) - Ui(PRG
B) of these voters and results in additional votes for party A. In 
issue 2 to 4, the initial utility difference Ui(PRG
A*) - Ui(PRG
B*) is negative, because party A 
offers a position less preferable for the addressees than that of party B. By making conces-
sions, party A can, however, reduce the difference between their two positions and gain fur-
ther votes. Regarding all changes in positions, party A’s first move does not lead to conver-
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gence. In some cases the platform approaches the median position (i.e. in issue 2 to 4), in 
other cases it moves away from the latter (i.e. in issue 1 and 5). Similarly, PRGA is some-
times closer (i.e. in issue 2, 3 and 4), sometimes further away from PRGB* than the ideal 
PRGA* (i.e. in issue 1 and 5). 






1 DIV A a M b
2 a A M b DIV
3 a A M b DIV
4 DIV b M A a
5 b M a A DIV
intensity of govermental 
interventions/activity
 
When the turn comes to party B, it faces the same incentives as party A. As depicted in fig-
ure 3, party B grants concessions to dominant-issue-voters to win the lost votes back and 
possibly attract further votes beyond those initial losses. Consequently party B will shift its 
positions on issue 1 to 5 in the same direction than party A did before. The adjusted policy 
platform PRGB  is denoted by large “B”s. It approaches the median position and PRGA in 
issues 1 and 5, while moving away from them in issues 2, 3 and 4.4  
                                                
4  In reality, there may be some issues which are not occupied by dominant-issue-voters. Thus it is not benefici-
ary for the parties to make concessions on these issues. The concessions towards dominant-issue-voters can be 
expected to create a budgetary shortage and/or welfare losses which in turn forces the parties to reduce the in-
tensity of governmental intervention or expenditures in some of these issues. This causes additional losses in 
utility among party members. 
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Figure 3. Programmatic concessions by party B 





1 DIV A a M B b
2 a A M b B DIV
3 a A M b B DIV
4 DIV B b M A a
5 b B M a A DIV
in tens ity  o f govermental 
in terven tions /activ ity
 
When comparing the distance between the policy platforms before (PRGA* - PRGB*) and 
after the two moves (PRGA - PRGB), no systematic reduction can be observed. In some is-
sues, the positions are closer, in others they are further away from each other than at the 
starting point of the election race. Systematic convergence in the sense of a reduction in dis-
tance between policy platforms only occurs if the party whose initial position is closer to the 
policy demanded by dominant-issue-voters (i.e. party A in issues 1 and 5 and party B in is-
sues 2 to 4) moves less far than the other party. This implies that the first-named party can 
attract less votes per unit concession in this issue than the party whose initial position was 
less favourable from the point of view of the addressed dominant-issue-voters. To give an 
example, convergence can be expected if conservative parties can gain more votes from 
making concessions in welfare issues than social democratic parties can. If the opposite is 
true, the policy positions will systematically diverge during party competition. Section 5 will 
show that divergence in policy platforms is more in line with the empirical evidence than con-
vergence. In sum, the pattern of movement in policy platforms derived above does not have 
any common features with the concept of convergence as defined above.  
Now one might argue that the model is still essentially a spatial model of voting, the differ-
ence being that the relevant median voter is defined differently. Instead of an overall median 
of all voters as depicted by the circled “M”, the relevant median position is given by the me-
dian dominant-issue voter for each issue. Without ideological costs and credibility problems, 
both parties will offer a policy platform PRGA respectively PRGB which consists of the bliss 
points of these median voters. Accounting for ideological costs and possible credibility prob-
lems, the PRGA and PRGB will still approach this vector and the party closer to it will win the 
election. Thereby the model leads to essentially the same conclusions as the spatial theory 
of voting does. In my view, this course of argumentation is misleading for two reasons.  
14 
 
First, as discussed above, the dominant-issue-voters’ positions on their dominant issue can-
not be interpreted as bliss points, because these are only meaningfully defined over all policy 
issues simultaneously. Instead, they have to be viewed to be the intensity of political inven-
tion which they consider appropriate/adequate for the isolated issue. In the initial situation, 
PRGA* and PRGB* state a position which is either too low or too high from the point of view of 
dominant-issue-voters. Graphically, they are located at the same end of the addressees’ pre-
ferred intensity. By moving their policy platforms closer to the demanded intensity of a domi-
nant-issue-voter, each party can increase the probability of acquiring the latter’s vote. On 
average, the move towards the addressees’ preferred intensity will bring additional votes 
among these voters. Now assume that both parties continue to move their policy platforms. 
As long as the leading party has not passed the preferred intensity of the first dominant-
issue-voter, it will – other things equal – receive more votes than its opponent. But what hap-
pens now if it passes the first voter’s intensity and proceeds until its position is further away 
from the first voter’s preferred intensity than the position of its opponent? If the voter’s pre-
ferred intensity is interpreted to be a bliss point, it would vote for opponent. In the present 
model, however, the voters who are offered an intensity of governmental intervention which 
points in the right direction and even exceeds the intensity they consider appropri-
ate/adequate does not necessarily punish the corresponding party by voting for its opponent. 
This can be expected only if the extreme position offered by the leading party causes the 
voter a net loss in utility. For most concessions, this seems unreasonable. This can be illus-
trated using the example of a number of farmers forming a group of dominant-issue voters 
who demand a certain degree of subsidization of their products. A farmer who considers a 
10 per cent subsidy adequate and has a voting bias of zero can be expected to prefer party 
A if this offers a 4 per cent subsidy while party B only offers 2 per cent. If party A comes to 
offer 12 per cent while party B only offers 9 per cent, this voter will still be better of if party A’s 
policy platform is put into action and thus vote accordingly, even though the distance to the 
demanded 10 per cent would lead him to vote for party B when following the spatial logic. 
Second, there are a number of mechanisms which restrict the parties’ moving their policy 
platforms and thus make it unlikely that the policy platforms pass the positions of a notable 
number of dominant-issue-voters. For once, the lacking credibility (e.g., Alesina, 1988) and 
the resistance of the party delegates not suggested for a political post which both prevent full 
convergence in the spatial theory of voting apply here as well. In addition, the reaction of 
those groups of voters who are not addressed by the particular concessions results in dimin-
ishing and eventually negative returns in votes from increasing concessions. This will be il-
lustrated in more detail in the section 4.2. 
4.2 The magnitude of movement in policy platforms 
Having identified the pattern of movement in policy platforms, it is now necessary to turn to 
the magnitude of this movement, i.e. the level of concessions. Let PA (PB) denote the total 
sum of concessions made by party A (B) across all issues occupied by dominant-issue-
voters. In order to be able to aggregate concessions made in different policy fields, they will 
hereafter be measured by the total rents granted to the addressees of concessions. Taking 
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the starting point as depicted in figure 1, where PA = 0 and PB = 0, each party can gain addi-
tional votes by making programmatic concessions. The paper follows standard theory of util-
ity in assuming that the marginal gains in utility and thus in votes each party can attract from 
increasing concessions will decline. Simultaneously, concessions produce increasing mar-
ginal losses in votes among those groups of voters who do not benefit from them but have to 
carry the burden via higher taxes or consumer prices. Thus either party can win only a limited 
number of votes by making concessions. Excessive concessions can lead to net losses in 
votes. Figure 4 visualizes the relationship between the sum of concessions of party A and 
the additional votes won  VA.  















0 low moderate high excessive
 
Assuming that both parties’ concessions have the same vote productivity, the votes won or 
lost depend on the difference in the level of concessions (PA – PB) made but not on their ab-
solute level:  
0PPPPfVV BABABA  ,)(     (2) 
Figure 5 visualizes the relationship between 
 
VA and (PA – PB). It shows that party A can win 
additional votes if it offers moderately more concessions than party B (PA – PB < P2
A). Alter-
natively, it can win votes by offering considerably less concessions than party B (PA – P2
A 
 < PB) provided the latter chooses a very high level of concessions (PB > P2
A). Assuming a 
close distribution of votes at the starting point of the political competition, party A can expect 
to win the election if  VA > 0 and lose the election if  VA < 0. In the case of  VA = 0, the final 
winner of the election is not predetermined by the parties’ activities but depends on the elec-
toral decision of a few indecisive voters. From the parties’ viewpoint, this is a lottery.  
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The parameter cA represents the ideological costs suffered by the party members per unit 
concession. A lexicographic utility function demands that cA < dA/max(P
A). The parameter dA 
(0 < dA < 1) expresses party A’s utility from a situation where 
V
A = 0. The higher dA, the 
higher the utility drawn from a victory by chance in comparison to the utility drawn from a 
clear victory which stems from having chosen the superior strategy. If dA = 0.5, party A is 
indifferent between the two situations. The value of dA depends on the subjective ex ante 
probability by which party A expects to win the election. A value of dA > 0.5 can be expected, 
if party A is convinced that its chances of winning the election are less than 0.5 and thus a 
draw is considered a success. If, however, party A estimates its ex ante chance of winning to 
be larger than 0.5, a value of dA < 0.5 can be expected. A draw is valued more like a defeat.  
In order to make predictions concerning the level of concessions the parties choose in this 
constellation, party competition is modelled as a one-shot game of simultaneous moves 
(e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1976; Alesina, 1988). For cA, cB = 0, party competition is a 
constant-sum-game and thus has no pure-strategy equilibrium. The latter conclusion holds 
for all values cA, cB > 0. Rational parties will choose a mix of pure strategies. As the deriva-
tion of a mixed equilibrium requires a discrete strategy space, the following passage restricts 
the eligible pure strategies for both parties to five different levels of concessions (q = 0, 1, 2, 
3, 4) named at the bottom of figure 5. The payoff matrix can be put up as shown in table 1. 
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Table 1. Payoff matrix of party A 
PA 
PB 
0 1 (low) 2 (moderate) 3 (high) 4 (excessive) 
0 dA, dB 1-cA, 0 dA–2cA, dB -3cA, 1 -4cA, 1 
1 (low) 0, 1-cB dA–cA, dB-cB 1-2cA, -cB dA-3cA, dB-cB -4cA, 1-cB 
2 
(moderate) 
dA, dB-2cB - cA, 1-2cB dA–2cA, dB–2cB 1-3cA, -2cB dA–4cA, dB-2cB 
3 (high) 1, -3cB dA-cA, dB–3cB -2cA, 1-3cB dA-3cA, dB-3cB 1-4cA, -3cB 
4 (exces-
sive) 
1, -4cB 1-cA, -4cB dA-2cA, dB-4cB -3cA, 1-4cB dA-4cA, dB–4cB 
 
Taking the strategy mix of the other party as given, each party will try to maximize the ex-





































A = share of pure strategy q in the mix of party A.  
  sq
B = share of pure strategy q in the mix of party B. 
If there exists a combination of },,,,{ 43210
AAAAAA sssssS   and },,,,{ 43210
BBBBBB sssssS   
for which all these conditions are satisfied simultaneously, this represents a Nash-
equilibrium. Setting up the system of equations necessary to resolve this problem reveals 
that the marginal utility of one party does not depend on its own mix of strategies but solely 
on the strategy-mix of the opponent. Therefore neither party can directly maximize its own 
utility by choosing a particular mix of strategies but has to choose a mix which makes it im-
possible for the political opponent to take advantage of it (e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook, 
1976; Holler and Illing, 2003: 67-73). 
The method of choosing the optimal mix of pure strategies is the same for both parties. The 
following illustrations will demonstrate it from the point of view of party A. Party A takes on 
the perspective of party B and tries to find the mix of sq
A which satisfies the set of conditions 
in (4b). Thus the optimal mix of party A depends on the parameter values cB and dB of the 
political opponent. The fact that sq
A, sq
B
  0  i and dA > cA max(P
A) = cA/4 restricts the com-
binations of dB and cB for which a Nash equilibrium exists. In figure 6, the area of valid com-
binations of parameter values is marked in grey.  
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For the special case where dB = 0.5 and cB = 0, there is no unique Nash equilibrium for the 
strategy-mix of party A. Instead party A is indifferent towards all combinations which satisfy 
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0      . In the case of positive policy preferences 








































  (6d) 
0s A4 	 . (6e) 
Regardless of the parameter settings, both parties can be expected to abstain from making 
excessive concessions (q = 4), because this strategy is dominated by making no conces-
sions (q = 0). 
Returning to the original questions, the expected total sum of concessions party A (B) makes 
in the competition for political power depends on dB (dA) and the severity of policy preference 













































































  (8) 
For all values of dB, dA < 0.5, both terms of these derivatives are positive and thus P
A and PB 
are positive functions of cB respectively cA. If dB, dA < 0.5, the second term becomes nega-
tive. Within the boundaries described in figure 6, however, it never overcompensates the first 
term and thus the derivatives remains positive. Therefore, whenever a Nash-equilibrium ex-
ists, the expected concessions of party A (B) are higher, the stricter the policy preferences of 
its political opponent party B (A) are. At the same time, the own policy preferences have no 
influence on the expected level of concessions a party makes during the election race. This 
conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the result of e.g. Wittman (1983).5 
In the case of positive policy preferences, the larger dB is, the higher the expected conces-
sions of party A if dB > 0.5, while the opposite is true if dB < 0.5. Party A will thus make more 
concessions, the more confident party B is of winning the election or the more unlikely a vic-
tory is from the party B’s point of view. Put differently, the expected concessions of party A 
increase as the absolute differences of |dB – 0.5| rises. Thus the further away party B’s sub-
jective ex ante chance of winning is from a fair 50:50 chance, the more concessions party A 
can be expected to make. It is important to note that this difference in ex ante chance of win-
ning does not result from an uneven distribution of votes at the starting point of the political 
competition. Instead, it may e.g. result from differences in the perceived competence of the 
campaigning teams or fluctuations in opinion polls.  
5. Relationship to empirical research 
This section turns to the question as to what extent the empirical literature contains evidence 
which support the theoretical considerations presented above, in particular the notion of par-
allel moves in policy platforms. The central problem in this task is that it is empirically impos-
sible to observe the starting point of party competition as modelled in economic theory. This 
consists of the parties’ bliss points or the PRGA* respectively PRGB* as depicted in figure 1 
together with the corresponding initial distribution of votes. The political programmes avail-
able for investigation, however, represent the policy platforms including concessions. Conse-
                                                
5  n order to test for robustness, a number of different numerical specifications of the model have been ana-
lysed. Allowing for values of PA, PB > 4 does not change the result as these are dominated by pure strategies 
granting less concessions. Thus, changes in equilibria can only be expected for games with a different partitioning 
of the area of 0  PA, PB  4 in the above game. When doubling the number of pure strategies by allowing for 
steps of PA, PB = 0.5, the expression for the equilibrial strategy mix gets too complicated to produce conclusive 
derivatives. By pre-specifying the value for dA, dB, interpretable results can be obtained. Like in the specification 
described in the main text, the first derivative of PA (PB) with respect to cB (cA) is a negative linear function of cB 
(cA) with a positive constant term. This constant term ensures that the derivative stays positive for all tested val-
ues of 0.1 

 dA, dB  0.9. Thus the main conclusions stated above are supported. Analogous results are also ob-
tained if the high and excessive conclusions are not allowed for (0  PA, PB  2). Finally, an asymmetric strategy 
space is analysed where a draw can only be reached if PA = PB, because the parties cannot choose the level of 
concessions described by P2
A in Figure 4. For all combinations where PA  PB, there is a clear winner. The above 
results hold for this scenario. Although these results do not provide a final proof for the conclusions above, they 
indicate that the conclusions drawn from the special numerically specified payoff matrix can be generalized. 
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quently, all conclusions concerning the pattern of movement in policy platforms have to be 
drawn indirectly. An indirect course of argumentation is also used to relate the empirical lit-
erature to the pattern of movement in policy platforms derived in section 4. The argumenta-
tion below draws on systematic studies by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG). The MRG 
has documented the policy platforms of all major parties in 19 democracies over several 
decades (e.g., Budge et al., 1987).  
The research by the MRG shows that the policy platforms in the observed countries and time 
periods remain distinctly different from those of their domestic competitors. Furthermore, the 
distance has not reduced systematically over time (e.g., Budge and Robertson, 1987; Ad-
ams, 2001). A distinct feature of party competition is the fact that parties seldom take direct 
confrontation by stressing the same particular issue in their party programmes and cam-
paigns. Most of the time, they “talk past each other”, meaning that they address different 
groups of voters. Therein, each party tends to choose the issue where its position is per-
ceived to be stronger and/or which is in line with its basic ideology. Pledges, i.e. promises to 
change the intensity of governmental intervention on certain issues, are allocated accordingly 
(e.g., Budge and Robertson, 1987).  
Expressing this pattern in terms of figure 1, party A will restrict its concessions to issue 1 and 
5, while party B will change its positions on issue 2, 3 and 4. Thus, the policy platforms will 
diverge. In the logic of the model above, this pattern of movement can be explained in two 
ways. First, the party with the less attractive position does not expect any gains in votes from 
catching up on the position of the political opponent, because the resulting concessions lack 
credibility (e.g., Alesina, 1988). Second, the corresponding concessions would collide with 
the ideological conviction of party members and thus cause extremely high ideological 
costs.6  
Based on empirical data of the MRG, Budge (1994) analyses how political parties change 
their position in consecutive elections. Instead of analysing different fields of politics, he 
traces the positions on the aggregated leftwing-rightwing scale. Budge finds evidence that 
parties alter their positions only within their own ideological area. Within this range, the larg-
est share of parties analysed alternate in the direction of movement from one election to the 
next, thus showing no systematic shift in positions. A substantial number of parties do, how-
ever, make systematic shifts if these are attracting additional votes. They take two consecu-
tive shifts in the same direction, if the first shift has led to an increase in votes. This observa-
tion suggests that political parties are not willing to leave “big bills on the sidewalk”, that is to 
stay put in positions where they know a shift – within the own ideological sphere – will bring 
additional votes. Transferred to the multidimensional political arena, this result supports the 
notion of parallel moves in policy platforms, provided they do not lack credibility or cause 
extensive ideological costs. In the view of the author, the race of German Christian Democ-
rats and Social Democrats in trying to outscore each other in promising to pay higher trans-
fers to families and especially to improve child-care facilities constitutes an example of such 
                                                
6  In some cases, there may be issues where both sides of the scale of preferences are occupied by dominant-
issue-voters. In this case, both parties can be expected to direct concessions to that end of the scale where their 
net gains in votes are positive; that is identify the stronger group and move in its direction. If the stronger group is 
different for the two parties, they will make divergent concessions. 
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parallel moves. The concessions made aim at young and especially high-skilled couples who 
want to have a family but have to incur high opportunity costs when raising children (e.g., 
Bischoff, 2002). Apart from income taxation, the quality of child care facilities is the most im-
portant of the politically determined arguments of their utility function. As their voting bias 
tends to be small in absolute size, both parties can gain votes among these voters. At the 
same time, both parties have only moderate ideological costs when addressing these voters.  
Another argument in support of the notion of parallel moves is the following: While the theo-
retical models take the ideal party programmes as starting points, real-life party competition 
refers to the status quo when formulating its policy platforms and pledges (e.g., Merrill and 
Grofman, 1999: 130-143). Assuming that the electorate is subject to an endowment effect 
(e.g., Kahneman et al., 1991) with respect to public services and privileges, taking existing 
services and privileges back will be very unpopular among voters. Thus, the status quo is 
determined by the pledges of numerous past governments. Merely by respecting the pledges 
the political opponent put through in the past, any party de facto shifts his position towards 
that of dominant-issue-voters which are normally only addressed by the political opponent. 
These shifts have much higher credibility than additional concessions to these groups. 
Consequently, they can credibly reduce the utility differential and thus win votes among the 
dominant-issue-voters, which could not have been won if the party would have had to prom-
ise the same policies in new concessions. At the same time, the ideological costs of keeping 
a policy measure introduced by a predecessor government can be expected to be lower than 
newly introducing the same measure for the first time.   
6. Conclusion 
The preceding sections presented a theoretical model of the political decision making proc-
ess in which two parties compete for the majority of votes in a heterogeneous electorate 
consisting of different groups of so-called dominant-issue-voters. Due to differences in their 
individual situation in life, the different groups will be informed about different parts of the 
parties’ policy platforms. Those parts on which they have detailed knowledge are of strong 
importance to them. Consequently they base their voting decision primarily on the policies 
proposed in these fields of policy. Compared to the overall electorate, dominant-issue-voters 
will furthermore prefer an intensity of governmental activity which lies at the extreme end of 
the scale of preferences rather than in the centre. In the course of party competition, both 
parties make programmatic concessions to dominant-issue-voters in various issues in order 
to acquire additional votes.  
The total level of concessions made during the election race cannot be determined ex ante 
because the Nash-equilibrium requires both parties to play a mixed strategy. Towards this 
end, the model developed here is similar to the multidimensional models following the spatial 
theory of voting. The expected level of concessions can be expressed as a function of certain 
party characteristics, in particular, their policy preferences. The stricter the policy preferences 
of the political opponent, the higher the expected level of concessions chosen by a party. At 
the same time, the party’s own intensity of policy preferences have no influence on the cho-
sen level of concessions. This result stands in contradiction to the conclusion drawn by e.g. 
Wittman (1983).  
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When comparing the pattern of movement in policy platforms emerging in the above model 
to the concept of convergence predicted by the spatial theory of voting, fundamental differ-
ences are revealed. First, the policy platforms are not attracted by  a central position on the 
scale of policy preferences but by positions at its ends. Second, both parties shift their policy 
platforms in the same direction rather than towards each other. For every political issue, the 
party whose initial policy platform is less attractive for dominant-issue-voters tries to catch up 
on the opponent. The party which offers the more favourable position intends to increase or 
at least maintain the initial difference in policy platforms. And therefore, third, there are no 
forces which systematically reduce the distance between policy platforms finally offered in 
the election to a level below the initial difference between the ideologically motivated ideal 
party programmes.  
The empirical evidence on the development in policy platforms compiled by the Manifesto 
Research Group supports the conclusions drawn from the theoretical model in parts. While 
no convergence in policy platforms is observed, parties are found to primarily address those 
groups of dominant-issue-voters who are already favored by their original position. A lack of 
credibility as well as excessive ideological costs may restrict the concessions to other domi-
nant-issue-voters. In the logic of this model, policy platforms can thus be expected to even 
diverge. At the same time, occasional observations and theoretical considerations suggest 
that parallel moves in policy platforms can be expected under certain conditions. In the view 
of the author, it would be very interesting to use the rich empirical data base compiled by the 
Manifesto Research Group to test the empirical tenability of the notion of parallel moves as 
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